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The nationally unique, 1980 Maine Indian land claims
settlement brought benefits to three of Maine’s tribes—
the Penobscot Nation, Passmaquoddy Tribe, and Houlton
Band of Maliseets. However, serious problems remain 
with the economic, health, and educational status of tribal
members. Moreover, another group, the Aroostook Band of
Micmacs, was not included in the original settlement.
Brimley’s analysis of Native American sovereignty in Maine
reviews the foundation of the land claims settlement, how 
it came to be enacted, its terms, and its impact on Maine’s
tribes. He notes how the recent failure of tribal efforts to
build a casino in the southern part of the state has exacer-
bated already-strained state-tribal relations. Commentaries
by Donna Loring of the Penobscot Nation, anthropologist
Lisa Neuman, and anthropologist-attorney Lawrence Rosen
provide additional, varying perspectives on Native
American sovereignty in Maine and elsewhere in the 
United States. 
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INTRODUCTION
Although there are several other notable Indian landclaims and settlements throughout the country, the
1980 Maine Indian land claim is unique both in its
sheer size and complexity, and because it was very
specific in defining the rights of the tribes that are party
to the settlement. From a policy perspective, the Maine
settlement represents a clear example of the direct
impact that limiting tribal sovereignty can have on the
health and well-being of Native American nations.1
This article will frame the discussion about the
impacts of the Maine Indian land claim settlement
around the basic elements of the initial claim made 
by the Penobscot Indian Nation and Passamaquoddy
Tribe (and later the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians),
as well as the ensuing settlement made between these
tribes and the state. Since the settlement initially was
perceived by some as a means for improving tribal-
state relations, the article will end with some recom-
mendations for reestablishing working relations that
have stalled recently due to several contentious issues,
such as the 2003 Indian gaming referendum and the
differing interpretation of the settlement act itself. 
NATIVE NATIONS AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS
To fully understand the impact of the settlement, it is important to first place Native American sover-
eignty in Maine in the national context. Although 
their respective histories, languages and cultures make
them unique, the 560 federally recognized tribes in 
the United States share some basic rights in common.
All federally recognized tribes have the right to: 
• Define their own form of government; 
• Determine the conditions for membership;
• Administer justice and enforce laws;2
• Tax; 
• Regulate domestic relations of their members;
and,
• Regulate property use.
Though native concepts
prior to European contact were
somewhat different from those
listed here, tribes formerly exer-
cised many, if not all, of these
powers. Since contact, the
nature and scope of many of
these rights have been defined
in non-native terms and limited
in practice. 
Recognition of tribes by
the U.S. federal government
implicitly defines the govern-
ment-to-government relation-
ship that exists between the
United States and the tribes by
recognizing the tribes’ inherent
sovereign status. In 1831, Chief Justice Marshall
described the tribal-federal relationship in the ruling of
the U.S. Supreme Court case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
as resembling “that of a ward to his guardian,” and
further described tribes as “domestic dependent
nations.”3 As explained in an earlier issue of Maine
Policy Review (Brimley 2004), this important, but
contradictory, phrase implies that Native American
tribes are sovereign nations that retain rights possessed
prior to the formation of the United States. At the 
same time, the decision suggests that tribes are inca-
pable of exerting those rights and, therefore, are
dependent upon the U.S. federal government. The
ruling more importantly defined a trust responsibility
that the federal government has to native nations—
to oversee and protect tribes and their resources from
destructive actions or potential harm. 
One year later, in 1832, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote in the Worcester v. Georgia Supreme Court deci-
sion that tribes do not lose their sovereign powers by
becoming subject to the power of the United States.4
This ruling also was important because it defined the
nature of relations between tribes and states by ruling
that state laws do not apply to tribes or on tribal lands
unless Congress specifically grants those powers to 
the respective states. As a result, tribes have the unique
status of nations within a state as well as nations within








claim is unique… .
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between the three “sovereigns” are meant to be
conducted on a government-to-government basis. 
Despite recent threats to Native American sover-
eignty from Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court,
particularly in the area of criminal jurisdiction, this
current era is generally viewed as one of the greatest
periods of Native American self-determination and
sovereignty post “discovery.” Numerous congressional
actions and court cases have inadvertently downplayed
Marshall’s historical notion of “domestic dependent” 
by emphasizing the importance and rights of Native
American self-rule and self-governance.5
In a modern world, where political and economic
systems are inextricably linked to one another, it is
impossible to find a completely sovereign nation in
practice. The comparatively limited level of tribal sover-
eignty in the United States today is due to tribes relin-
quishing certain rights through treaties or agreements,
or because rights were taken from them without their
consent through specific acts of Congress. Despite 
these limitations, the Supreme Court has continuously
supported the notion that the sovereign rights of tribes
remain fully intact unless those rights are specifically
and clearly taken away from or given away by the tribes.
As a result, each tribe has retained varying degrees of
the sovereignty it possessed prior to European contact.
Again, it is the de facto rights (rights in practice) of
tribes that enable them to exert their sovereignty, which
have been given away. These de facto rights often differ,
sometimes dramatically, from one tribe to the next, even
within the same state. For example, only three out of
the four tribes in Maine are affected by the 1980
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act.6 The Aroostook
Band of Micmacs, which did not sign the initial settle-
ment act, has clearly defined sovereign rights that are
different from those of the Houlton Band of Maliseet
Indians, the Penobscot Indian Nation and the
Passamaquoddy Tribe.7 This issue will be discussed
further later in the article, as it is one of the most con-
tentious issues defining relations between the Micmac
Indians in Maine and the state today. 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIM
In order to fully understand why the affected tribeswould agree to have their de facto sovereignty limited,
it is important first to understand the circumstances
under which the claim was made and the dire living
conditions that plagued the majority of native peoples
within the state. In conjunction with that, it is also
important to view the final settlement in its entirety to
further highlight the dubious task that tribes had in
weighing the short-term benefits that would come with
the settlement against the long-term costs with which
the tribes continue to cope today. It also is necessary 
to understand the national political environment under
which the agreement was negotiated, as that had a
direct influence on the behavior of the parties involved.
The foundation for the Maine Indian land claim
was started in the late 18th century, when the U.S.
Congress realized the potential for costly land disputes
with native tribes as an increasing number of settlers
moved farther west. In an effort to preempt any poten-
tial conflict, Congress passed the trade and intercourse
act in 1790. The act placed the management of trade,
diplomatic relations and land cessions involving 
Native Americans exclusively in the hands of the U.S.
Congress. From 1790 on, regardless of whether land
was transferred from a single Native American or an
entire tribe, Congress was responsible for ratifying 
the transaction or the transaction would not be valid.
The land claim brought forward by the Penobscot
Indian Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine
argued that the treaties signed between the respective
tribes and the state of Massachusetts just after 1790
(the state of Maine did not exist until 1820) were never
ratified by the U.S. Congress. According to the 1790
… the land claim involved more than trying
to reclaim traditional lands that had been
wrongfully and illegally taken.
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trade and intercourse act, the treaties were, therefore,
null and void, and the tribes were owed—or at least
due fair compensation for—the land lost due to the
treaties (in addition to thousands of acres subsequently
lost). The state argued vigorously that the original 
trade and intercourse act was intended only to apply 
to land transactions involving tribes west of the
Mississippi and not to tribes in the east that had
already been “settled.”8 The Court eventually ruled
in favor of the tribes’ basic argument, paving the 
way for the largest and most complex land claim ever
brought forth in the United States.9 In total, the land
claim amounted to more than two-thirds of the
present-day state of Maine.
Understanding the conditions on most tribal lands
prior to the claim is perhaps one of the best ways to
understand why the tribes took on such a task. In
retrospect, it is difficult to think from a legal standpoint
that two relatively small and poor tribes would take on
such a monumental claim. That is, until you realize that
the tribes had nothing, literally, to lose. Although it
had no ties to the land claim, a report was published in
1974 by the Maine Advisory Committee to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, which provides one
of the best insights into Maine at the time and what it
was like for most native peoples in the state. Based on
hearings held throughout the state during 1973, the
committee found the living conditions of most Native
Americans in the state to be dire at best. In the final
report to the commission, the committee wrote:
Both State and Federal services have been
withheld from a people whose need for assis-
tance is tragically evident: unemployment
among Maine Indians as of 1973 was reliably
estimated at 65 percent; a 1971 survey of
off-reservation housing for Indians found 45
percent substandard and poor; health studies
of the Maine Indians reveal chronic and
severe problems of alcoholism, malnutrition,
and disease; bicultural education, which is
central to the preservation of tribal values and
traditions, is largely non-existent; the ratio 
of Indian children in foster care homes is 16
times that of the general population, yet only
4 of the 136 Indian children under foster care
in Maine have been placed in Indian homes—
homes which in some cases were built by the
State but are now considered physically inad-
equate to meet state licensing standards; and
while Indians are held responsible for law
enforcement on reservations, they are unable
to set safe speed limits on State highways
crossing their lands. 
The advisory committee went on to conclude:
…that these facts are not isolated quirks of
circumstance: they are the result of long-
standing assumptions, policies, and practices
of discrimination against Maine’s Native
American population.
It becomes readily apparent upon reading the final
report that the land claim involved more than trying 
to reclaim traditional tribal lands that had been wrong-
fully and illegally taken. The land claim was, in fact,
more about reclaiming a culture and a way of life that
had existed for thousands of years. 
THE MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIM10
The modern genesis of the land claim was begun in 1964, when a non-native trespassed onto
Passamaquoddy land that he wrongfully claimed as 
his (he claimed to have won the deed to the land in
question in a poker game from the previous owner).
Investigations by the tribe and its lawyer into the
disputed property revealed that land totaling more than
6,000 of the original 23,000 acres granted to the
Passamaquoddy in their treaty with Massachusetts in
1794 had been lost or wrongfully taken, including the
piece in question. After four years of research the orig-
inal claim was filed in a Boston court. However, it was
not until Tom Tureen, who had been a student intern
working on the original case, took the lead in the case
that the claim took on the magnitude that the settle-
ment is characterized with today. Tureen began by
investigating whether the 1790 act was applicable to
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the tribes in Maine. Exhaustive research supported the
belief that the act did in fact apply. Tureen now had
established the basis for the argument that led to the
tribes laying claim to two-thirds of the state.
Tureen’s next challenge was to find a way to get 
the case heard in court. Historically, tribes had not fared
well in state court so he decided that the case would best
be fought in federal court. By law, a private party cannot
sue a state. Getting the case heard in federal court would
therefore require the federal government to file suit
against the state of Maine on behalf of the tribes—
something that to that point had rarely been done, 
especially for a non-federally recognized tribe. The 
legal problems for the tribes, however, had only begun.
Because of a recently implemented congressional statute
of limitation on Indian land claims, Tureen and the tribes
had only six months to get their case into court. Tureen
began in earnest by lobbying Governor Kenneth Curtis
for help; Curtis had been seen by the tribes as sympa-
thetic to the cause. Governor Curtis did make a public
statement on behalf of the tribes, saying that a case 
of this merit should not end on a statute of limitation. 
With the deadline for filing rapidly approaching, 
Tureen continued his lobbying efforts by contacting 
the Maine congressional delegation, including Senators
Edmund Muskie and Margaret Chase Smith, and
Representatives Peter Kyros and William Hathaway.
Seeing the merits of the case for themselves prompted
each member to write letters of support on behalf of
Tureen and the tribes to the Department of Justice,
encouraging them to file suit against the state of Maine.
The Justice Department eventually responded by filing 
a $150 million dollar suit against the state—one day
before the statute was to expire. 
In 1974, the tribes received another major boost
to their case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed two
lower court decisions in a New York Indian land claim
case by ruling that the 1790 trade and intercourse act
did apply not only to tribes west of the Mississippi 
but also within the original 13 colonies. Consequently,
the federal judge appointed to the Maine case had no
choice but to apply the ruling here. The celebrations 
by Tureen and the tribes were short-lived, however, as
Governor Curtis (who had already served his two terms
in office) was replaced in 1975 by the then relatively
unknown Independent James B. Longley. Longley
quickly made his mark on the case by adamantly
refusing to address the merits of the Indian land claim.
It was not long, however, before the economic and
political situation forced Longley to get involved. 
He, in turn, would become a strong opponent to 
the national model of tribes as nation within a state,
arguing that a new model for tribal-state relations 
had to be developed not only for Maine but for the
country altogether. 
Lobbying and legal wrangling, complete with a
surprising turnaround by the Maine congressional dele-
gation, who had unsuccessfully proposed legislation to
extinguish the claim, continued in earnest for another
two years before the tribes got another surprising and
unexpected boost in 1976. When the Boston law firm
of Ropes and Gray, which provided legal advice to 
the issuers of New England municipal bonds, discov-
ered that the tribes would have civil jurisdiction over
disputed lands if they won the claim, the firm was
forced to announce that clean bond ratings could not
be given to any municipality in the disputed territory.
In addition, tax liens were no longer enforceable. When
Millinocket, Ellsworth, Calais and Hampden, among
several other municipalities, were not able to secure
loans or to continue municipal construction projects,
Governor Longley and the rest of the state and federal
government were forced to take notice.
In an effort to quell the political and economic
turmoil that was quickly spiraling out of control, and
thanks in part to a strong showing in Maine in the
recent election, President Carter became involved in 
the Maine land claim case in 1977. President Carter
asked a long-time friend and a former Georgia Superior
Court judge to investigate the merits of the claim. 
After four months of research, Judge Gunter recom-
mended to President Carter that the claim should not
be pursued due to the potential impact on the economy
of Maine. Despite the recommendation, Carter felt
obligated to help the tribes. Carter appointed a task
force to work with the respective parties to develop a
settlement. The three-person task force met eight times
with an 11-person Passamaquoddy-Penobscot negoti-
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ating committee, which included the tribal governors
from the three reservations (Penobscot and the two
Passamaquoddy reservations), and eight other elected
members from the tribes. The state of Maine chose 
to boycott the meetings. In February 1978, the tribes 
and the federal government signed a memorandum 
of agreement that would pave the way for a final
settlement that would eventually include the state.
Two more years of legal wrangling and court
cases, lobbying, political turnover and congressional
hearings ensued. Both the state and the tribes were
feeling the strain of the multi-year negotiations and
were eager to settle the claim once and for all. By
1980, it was clear that Carter was likely to be replaced
by Ronald Reagan, who had already announced that
he would not sign any Maine settlement. The tribes
were once again under a time constraint to get the
settlement done in time for President Carter to sign. 
In the spring of 1980 Senator Muskie was made
Secretary of State by President Carter. George Mitchell
was, in turn, appointed by Governor Brennan (who had
been attorney general under Longley) to replace
Muskie. This was fortuitous and timely for the tribes, 
as Mitchell was well-liked and had served as counsel of
record in the claim while he served as U.S. Attorney for
the District of Maine. He had also served as a federal
judge in Maine district court (Brodeur 1985; Rolde
2004: 117-18). In realizing the growing bipartisan
support developing in Maine to find a settlement, the
other senator from Maine reversed his long-standing
opinions about extinguishing the settlement, and with
the help of Mitchell presented the previously drafted
Maine settlement act for congressional hearings. With
little fanfare the settlement act was sent to the House 
of Representatives on September 19, 1980. Three days
later it was approved by the Senate and passed into law.
THE SETTLEMENT11
Despite having a strong case against the state, after years of laborious politicking and battling 
in courts, it is easy to see in retrospect why the tribes
opted for a settlement. The tribes never publicly
acknowledged that they had a strong case, as they were
more aware than anyone that things could have been
dramatically different. Historically, after all, things had
not always worked in the tribes’ favor. The final settle-
ment was a mixture of hard work and a fair amount of
luck for the tribes. As is the nature of most settlements,
however, no party can declare an outright victory. 
The major components of the negotiated settle-
ment can be summarized as follows:
Further Claims
The settlement signed in 1980 put an end to any
further land claims by any individual Native American,
tribe, nation or band in Maine. It legally ratified all past
Native American land transactions as if they were legal,
and removed any obligations of the state with regard 
to any previous land transactions. 
Recognition
Federal recognition was granted to the Penobscot,
the Passamaquoddy and the Houlton Band of Maliseet
Indians. Federal recognition provided each tribe access
to and eligibility for much needed federally funded
Indian programs and services in areas such as housing,
health and environmental management. The Aroostook
Band of Micmacs, which was state-recognized, did not
obtain federal recognition until 1991. 
Land
In addition to their existing tribal lands, the
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy were each provided
with $26.8 million to purchase land. The first 150,000
acres of land respectively purchased by each tribe was
Despite having a strong case against the 
state, after years of laborious politicking and
battling in courts, it is easy to see in retro-
spect why the tribes opted for settlement.
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eligible to be held in trust by the federal government.
Any additional land above and beyond the 150,000
acres would then be considered fee-land and would
have the same status as any other privately held land in
the state. For any land purchased beyond the 150,000
acres, the tribes could go through the process that
other tribes went through to place land in trust. The
Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians was provided with
$900,000 for the purchase of additional lands, subject
to approval from the Maine legislature. 
Trust Fund
In addition to money for land purchases, both 
the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes were
provided with trust funds that totaled $12.5 million
each. The funds would be held in trust by the U.S.
federal government and would be invested in consulta-
tion with the tribes. The interest made from an addi-
tional $1 million provided to each tribe was specifically
earmarked for tribal members over 60 years of age. 
Municipal Status
One of the most contested aspects of the settle-
ment act centers on the municipal status granted to the
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy. The tribes argue they
would never relinquish their sovereign status and that
the municipal status was meant to be in addition to
their sovereignty—granting them access to municipal
funding sources for the development and repair of
infrastructure on the reservation, for example. The state
argues that the municipal status replaces their sovereign
status with the status equivalent to that of a munici-
pality. The settlement act clearly states, except as other-
wise provided, that the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy,
within their respective territories, “shall have, exercise,
and enjoy the rights, privileges, powers and immunities
of a municipality (including the power to enact ordi-
nances and collect taxes); Be subject to all the duties,
obligations, liabilities, and limitations of a municipality;
and be subject to the laws of the State” (Scully 1995).
Internal tribal matters, such as forming a government
and elections, were strictly left to the respective tribes.
Without further clarification the tribes are relegated to
having federal recognition with clearly defined limita-
tions in exerting their sovereign rights, making them
subject to some state oversight. 
Jurisdiction
The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy are subject to
the same federal laws that cover other federally recog-
nized tribes unless otherwise mentioned in the settle-
ment act. The settlement also states that no federal 
laws passed after 1980 apply to the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy, unless these tribes are clearly mentioned
in the law. Other important areas of jurisdiction that are
specifically defined in the settlement include:
• The application of the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978—a federal law to protect Indian
families from having their children placed 
in non-Indian homes during extenuating
circumstances; 
• The ability of the tribes to form their own
courts to oversee minor civil and criminal
crimes committed by Native Americans. This
mirrors the federal Major Crimes Act that
defines the types of crimes that other feder-
ally recognized tribes have jurisdiction over;
• Sovereign immunity that is equal to that
granted to other municipalities—not to other
federally recognized tribes; 
TABLE 1: Summary of Settlement Funds Transferred to Tribes
Trust funds: Passamaquoddy tribes $ 12,500,000
Trust funds: Passamaquoddy elderly $ 1,000,000
Trust funds: Penobscot Indian Nation $ 12,500,000
Trust funds: Penobscot elderly $ 1,000,000
Land acquisition: Passamaquoddy tribes $ 26,800,000
Land acquisition: Penobscot Indian Nation $ 26,800,000
Land acquisition: Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians $ 900,000
Total $81,500,000
Source: Scully 1995
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• The right of the tribes to develop rules for
hunting and trapping on their lands and for
fishing, provided the water is completely
within their territory and is less than 10 acres;
and, 
• The two tribes must make payments to the
state in lieu of taxes. Federally recognized
tribes, as sovereign nations, are not subject to
the same taxation as non-natives. This compo-
nent of the settlement enables the state to still
receive revenue that would otherwise be lost
but does not allow the state to take native
lands under its tax laws.
Tribal-State Commission
With the advent of federal funding for many of
the native programs that were previously covered by
the state, the Maine Department of Indian Affairs was
closed after the passage of the settlement. It was widely
recognized that in lieu of the state department of
Indian affairs there had to be a new formal and institu-
tionalized means for communication between the state
and the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot. The Maine
Indian Tribal-State Commission was formed with four
distinct responsibilities (Scully 1995):
• “…to review and make reports concerning
the effectiveness of the settlement act and the
social, economic, and legal relationship
between the state and the Passamaquoddy
Tribe and the Penobscot Indian Nation”;
• The commission can recommend the addition
of lands, other than those already described in
the settlement, to Passamaquoddy tribal or
Penobscot territory (upon local approval);
• The commission can act to “promulgate
fishing rules on certain ponds, rivers, and
streams adjacent to or within Passamaquoddy
or Penobscot Indian territory”; and,
• The commission is required to review fish and
wildlife management practices on non-native
lands in order to make recommendations on
how to further protect fish and wildlife within
native territory.
THE IMPACT OF THE SETTLEMENT 
In 1974, the Advisory Committee to the UnitedStates Commission on Civil Rights recognized and
acknowledged the potential effect that federal recogni-
tion would have on bringing much-needed funding
and services to native peoples in Maine. Although the
funding and access to federal services has often been
inadequate, the tribes of Maine have benefited from
funding and program support from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Indian Health Services, Department of
Justice, Administration of Native Americans, Fish and
Wildlife Service, Environmental Protection Agency 
and Housing and Urban Development to name a few.
Program support from federal agencies has enabled 
the tribes to establish and maintain their own health,
police, environmental and education departments. 
One of the most noticeable areas of impact from
the settlement has been the ability of the tribes to
increase their land base. As previously mentioned, the
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy were each given $26.8
million to purchase lands, and the Houlton Band of
Maliseet Indians was given $900,000. Although their
land holding will never match their traditional territo-
ries, each of the settlement tribes has managed to
purchase some substantial amounts of land within
Maine. The Houlton Band, for example, has purchased
and placed into trust more than 800 acres in and
around Houlton, Maine. In a state where the price of
land on the whole is rapidly increasing, and where
One of the most noticeable areas of impact
from the settlement has been the ability 
of the tribes to increase their land base.
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large tracts of land are rarely available, both of the 
two remaining tribes have struggled to obtain the
150,000 acres set aside for trust by the settlement.
They have managed, however, to add several thousand
acres to their land holdings across the state. The
Passamaquoddy tribe is one of the state’s largest 
landholders, with more than 100,000 acres. 
Although none of the tribes in Maine has had
overwhelming long-term success with economic devel-
opment ventures, there have been some notable short-
term exceptions. Perhaps the most successful economic
initiative ventured into by a Maine tribe was the
purchase of the Dragon Cement plant in Thomaston,
Maine by the Passamaquoddy Tribe. With very little
competition and with a construction boom throughout
the region (most notably the “Big Dig” in Boston), the
tribe managed to make a $60 million profit when they
sold the plant in 1988. The tribe kept the most impor-
tant asset of the Dragon Cement venture—a patent for
a sulfur-dioxide-emissions scrubber that is so efficient
and cost-effective that it may single-handedly reduce
smokestack-industry contributions to acid rain. The
U.S. Department of Energy gave $5 million to the tribe
to develop the scrubber while they owned Dragon
Cement to help the plant meet newer and stricter emis-
sion standards. Now, with the patent, the tribe stands to
make millions of dollars by selling the scrubber world-
wide. Other notable successes include a blueberry farm
owned by the Passamaquoddy, and Olamon Industries, 
a factory on the Penobscot’s Indian Island Reservation,
which produced high-quality tape cassettes (White
1990). Unfortunately, long-term economic success on
Native American reservations in Maine has been the
exception rather than the rule. 
Despite the benefits of federal recognition and
their relative success with securing federal funding and
services, purchases of land and economic development,
tribes in Maine continue to face proportionally higher
rates of unemployment, greater rates of cancer, obesity,
alcoholism and diabetes, and tribal members continue
to have lower rates of education attainment and
adequate housing than the overall population in Maine
(see Table 2 for some selected population comparisons). 
Although it is difficult to develop accurate statistics
with a small sample population such as this, examining
health status offers a good representation of the overall
current state of Native Americans in Maine. With little
to no support from the state, a major hurdle for Maine’s
tribes is that the amount of federal funding available for
native programs, including health, is divided between all
the federally recognized tribes according to the number
of members enrolled in each tribe. The tribes in Maine




Total Population 1,274,923 7,098
Education (age 25 and over)
Less than high school 19.6% 24.0%
H.S. diploma or GED 36.2% 32.9%
Some college 19.0% 23.8%
Associate’s degree 7.4% 7.2%
Bachelor’s or higher 22.9% 12.1%
Income and Poverty
Per capita income $19,533 $12,700
Median household income $37,240 $25,470
Median family income $45,179 $28,475
Families below poverty 11.5% 26.0%
Population below poverty 10.9% 31.5%
Employment (age 16 and over)
In labor force 65.3% 60.1%
Unemployed 4.7% 12.4%
Life Expectancy 77 63
Sources: Figures on life expectancy are from Kuehnert (2000). The other figures are
from Census 2000. Total population is from the full census (dataset SF-1) and the
remainder from the sample (dataset SF-3); both datasets are available online at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=DEC&_lang=en
Note: Census data are based on the responses of those who identified themselves as
just “American Indian or Alaska Native,” a population of 7,098 in 2000. In 2000, for
the first time, people could self-report as belonging to more than one “race”/ethnic
group. However, census breakdowns are not available for those who identified them-
selves to be “American Indian or Alaska Native” and some other group (an addi-
tional population of 6,058).
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have very few members compared to the larger tribes of
the West, so the amount of funding received often does
not meet their needs. Past surveys of tribal health direc-
tors around the state consistently have listed the top
three health problems among tribal members as diabetes
and its complications, addictions (tobacco, alcohol 
and other substances) and obesity (Kuehnert 2000).
Although many of the health problems faced by tribes
in Maine are treatable and preventable, as previously
mentioned, tribes are almost entirely reliant on federal
funding that often is erratic in nature and consistently
inadequate—particularly when tribes are also forced 
to confront an increasing number of more difficult to
treat socio-economic health problems such as suicide,
automobile accidents and cancer. These facts are particu-
larly disturbing since the Native American population 
is proportionally younger than the general Maine 
population. Therefore, these same life-threatening prob-
lems affect not just individual tribal members but the
viable existence of the entire tribe.
The Casino Effort 
Due to the often inadequate amount of federal
funding for health programs, as well as for programs
such as law enforcement and environmental manage-
ment, tribes are forced to find economic development
strategies to fill the gaps and to meet the needs of
their members. Across the country, a common and 
relatively successful strategy has been the develop-
ment of tribally run casinos. The casino industry has
expanded across the nation in the last decade, with
more than 600 casinos in 26 different states, most of
which are tribally run. In 2003 the Passamaquoddy
and Penobscot attempted to add to those numbers 
by proposing a tribally run casino in southern Maine. 
As previously mentioned, the settlement act clearly
states that federal Indian law does not apply to the
tribes in Maine after 1980 unless the federal law specif-
ically and clearly mentions Maine. Specific and targeted
concessions are rare in federal laws. As a result, tribes 
in Maine have not been able to benefit from the many
protections, services and economic advantages that
other federally recognized tribes have realized in the
past 24 years. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) of 1988 is one such federal law.12 The act
specifically articulates that Indian tribes, as sovereign
nations, possess the right to establish and operate
gaming facilities to promote tribal economic develop-
ment and self-sufficiency, but the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy are not able to take advantage of
IGRA because it was passed after 1980. In addition, 
no reservation land in Maine is located in areas that
could strategically take advantage of larger urban popu-
lations that are needed to make gambling facilities
economically viable. As a result, the Maine tribes were
forced to look in the southern part of the state to 
take advantage of the larger population centers in
Maine and even further south toward Massachusetts.
Not being able to take advantage of a federal Indian
gaming law and having to build off reservation put 
the tribes at the mercy of the state and the voters of
Maine. The issue became one of the most contentious
debates in Maine’s history. 
In November 2003, the gaming referendum 
was soundly beaten by nearly a two-to-one margin.
Numerous reasons for the defeat have been voiced
publicly, including claims by the tribes of widespread
racism. Although there is a long history of well-
documented, institutionalized racism towards Native
Americans in Maine, as described in the 1974 advi-
sory committee report, it is more likely that the tribes
of Maine were just plainly beaten by a well-organized
opposition that was able to convince the majority of
Mainers that a casino was a bad idea. However, the
claims of racism linger, because another referendum
question on the same ballot, proposing non-tribally
owned slot machine gambling at racetracks (so-called
“racinos”), passed despite offering fewer jobs and less
Not being able to take advantage of
federal Indian gaming law and having to
build off reservation put the tribes at the
mercy of the state and voters of Maine.
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financial benefit to the state and surrounding com-
munities. (At the time of the referendum, a racino 
had been locally approved only by the citizens of
Bangor, while Scarborough’s citizens had already
vigorously defeated such efforts. The racino refer-
endum, in essence, only affected Bangor.) Nonetheless,
the tribes felt that the defeat of the casino referendum
was yet another unfair rejection of an opportunity 
for them to prosper.
The defeat of the tribal gaming referendum and
the contentious debates that went along with the
campaign were the final straw that broke the state-
tribal relation’s back. The November 2003 meeting 
of the Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission began 
with a statement by the Passamaquoddy representatives
that, in light of the negative nature of the campaign
and the resounding defeat of the referendum, the
Passamaquoddy Tribe decided to leave the commission
and to reexamine their relationship with the state. As 
a sign of support, the Penobscot representatives also
removed themselves. The commission is currently at 
a standstill. There are ongoing discussions about the
future and nature of tribal-state relations in Maine, but
the near future is far from clear.
THE AROOSTOOK BAND OF MICMACS
Since the Aroostook Band of Micmacs did not havethe appropriate historical documentation showing
that their historical territory included parts of Maine,
they were not included in the 1980 settlement. They
were, however, greatly affected by it. With the federal
recognition of the three other tribes and the subse-
quent provision of federal aid, the state no longer saw
the need for the Maine Department of Indian Affairs.
With the closing of the department, and without
federal recognition, the Micmac were left without any
means of formal communication with the state and
without any provision for receiving the aid or services
to which they had become accustomed. 
Although the 1980 settlement act clearly states that
it covers all Indian peoples, tribes, nations, etc. in the
state, it is unrealistic and incomprehensible to think that
that the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy and Maliseet could
speak on behalf of all native peoples, tribes, or bands 
in Maine. It would be inconceivable to ask a sovereign
nation such as England to sign a treaty for all the sover-
eign states of Europe. Regardless, the state of Maine
continues to argue to this day that the 1980 settlement
directly affects the Aroostook Band of Micmacs.
By 1986, the Aroostook Band had compiled the
necessary documentation for them to pursue federal
recognition. In response, the state enacted an act 
to “Implement the Aroostook Band of Micmacs
Settlement Act.”13 The act recognized the Band’s
aboriginal claim to land in Maine, but similar to 
the 1980 act, tried to limit the Band’s sovereign
authority in response. In order to make the act law, 
the state required the Band to agree in writing to 
the act. The Band never provided that statement. 
In 1991, the U.S. Congress sought to rectify 
the inequities caused by the 1980 settlement. On
November 26, 1991 Congress passed the Aroostook
Band of Micmacs Settlement Act (PL 102-171), which
granted the Band $900,000 compensation for aborig-
inal land lost and 5,000 acres. Although the 1991 act
also ratified the state’s 1989 Micmac implementing act,
a thorough review of both the legislative history and
the language within the 1991 law clearly show that
Congress had no intention of abrogating the sovereign
authority of the Aroostook Micmac.14 The best indica-
tion of this is that the 1980 settlement only tangen-
tially refers to the Aroostook Band, while the 1991 law
clearly defines the relationship between the Band and
the state of Maine.15 If Congress had fully intended to
apply the same limitations to the Band’s sovereignty, as
It is no secret that tribal-state relations
historically have been strained in Maine.
The settlement act has done little to
improve relations, and in most cases has
further contributed to the strain.
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they had done with the other tribes in Maine in 1980,
they could have easily amended the 1980 settlement
act. Instead, they chose to make their actions clear by
passing a new law that established a new relationship
between a tribe in Maine and the state. By all indica-
tions, the Micmac in Maine are a fully recognized
sovereign group. 
DOES LIMITED TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
REALLY MATTER?
An abundance of research conducted over the last20 years shows clearly and undeniably that when
native nations exert their sovereignty and take matters
into their hands to create local solutions to local prob-
lems, they not only succeed but prosper. Institutions
such as the Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development have not found a single
example of sustained economic development on a
Native American reservation where the models for
development have been imposed or developed by
outside agencies, or where native nations have not
exerted their inherent and de facto sovereignty.16
Sovereignty, above all else, determines successful
economic development on reservations. 
The benefits of economic development on reserva-
tions also have been clearly shown to expand well
beyond the boundaries of reservations to benefit
surrounding communities.17 With well-documented
research findings, policymakers, practitioners and politi-
cians should be revisiting the Maine settlement to
determine what, if any, impact the act has had on tribes
in pursuing economic development and on the entire
state of Maine. 
Due to their sovereign status, federally recognized
tribes are not subject to the same tax structures as non-
reservation lands, thus making them ideal for locating
businesses. As the majority of tribal lands are located 
in the poorest counties of Maine, any economic devel-
opment on reservations would greatly benefit the
surrounding communities, which are in dire need of
jobs. Depending on the type and size of business, it 
is unlikely the tribes would be able to supply all the
needed and necessary human capital for any business
venture located on reservation lands. Towns in Maine
where tribal lands are located potentially could be
faced with the same problem with which Philadelphia,
Mississippi is now faced—traffic jams caused by thou-
sands of non-natives commuting to and from the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw reservation, where they
work in more than a dozen factories and industries,
producing everything from food containers for fast
food restaurants around the country to airplane parts
for the U.S. military. 
WAYS FORWARD TO IMPROVING 
TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS
It is no secret that tribal-state relations historically havebeen strained in Maine. The settlement act has done
little to improve relations, and in most cases has further
contributed to the strain. Maine is not unique in this
matter, as tribal-state relations have become increasingly
strained around the country as Native American tribes
grow more politically and economically savvy and
active. The difference, however, is that many of the
other states confronted with conflict have been willing
and able to overcome the challenges and to dramatically
improve relations. For example, on May 22, 1996, 
the governor of Oregon signed Executive Order 
EO-96-30, State of New Mexico State/Tribal Government-
To-Government Relations Policy. The order recognizes the
unique legal status of Native American tribes and, as a
result, requires state agencies to work with tribes on a
government-to-government basis. Implementation and
monitoring of the policy is conducted by tribal-state
workgroups called “Clusters” (Quigley 2000). In 1998,
the governor of New Mexico signed Executive Order 
98-10, State of New Mexico State/Tribal Government
Relations Policy. Similar to EO-96-30 in Oregon, 98-10
recognizes the sovereign status of tribes in the state 
and confirms the state’s intent in cooperatively working
with tribes.18 The recognition of the unique legal status
of Native Americans in New Mexico has been institu-
tionalized with the creation of that state’s highly
acclaimed Indian Affairs Department.19 In Montana, 
the Legislative Committee on Indian Affairs created a
handbook in 1995 for all state legislators that outlines
seven basic but important principles of state-tribal 
relations (Reed and Zelio 1995).
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In light of the above examples and many others
around the country, the following are offered as poten-
tial ways forward to improving tribal-state relations in
Maine. (Many of these recommendations, and examples
of each, may be found in Reed and Zelio 1995.)
• Review of the Settlement and
Implementation Acts: A complete and
comprehensive review of the settlement must
be completed to determine the overall
economic, political and cultural impact not
only on the tribes but on communities
surrounding reservations and on the state as a
whole. This would allow policymakers, practi-
tioners, politicians and tribal leaders to iden-
tify ways, if needed, of revising the act to
improve the conditions of all those affected.
• Executive Education: Both state and tribal
leadership (including program-level leaders)
would benefit greatly from educational oppor-
tunities that exposed them to the workings 
of each other’s government agencies and to
how the respective governments function in
general. These opportunities would increase
not only knowledge but also respect that
eventually could foster improved relations. 
• Increased Communication: At present, the
majority of communications between tribes in
Maine and the state are done in response to
crisis situations, such as following the defeat
of the 2003 gaming referendum. It is clear
that a proactive rather than a reactive liaison
would be a huge benefit. Communication
between the parties would greatly increase
with a formal and permanent body such as
Department of Indian Affairs. States such 
as New Mexico have greatly benefited from 
such a department. However, the department
would have to be vested with the proper
authority to make recommendations and
changes at all the necessary and appropriate
levels of government.
• Institutionalize Government-to-
Government Relations: Although the
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy have represen-
tatives at the state legislature, they are non-
voting members, which does not always give
them the audience they rightly deserve. In
addition, all tribes in Maine should be equally
represented in Augusta to recognize the 
sovereign status of each. The formation of
a Department Indian Affairs would also
greatly contribute to this effort. 
• Find Common Ground: Not surprisingly,
tribes and states share many of the same day-
to-day challenges of building healthy and
functioning governments. Perhaps the greatest
struggle shared by both the tribes and the
state is in finding new sources of revenue to
cover the increasing costs of providing for
their citizens. These shared challenges have
been catalysts for numerous tribal-state agree-
ments around the country in the areas of
revenue sharing, natural resource management,
healthcare and law enforcement. There are
ample opportunities for this type of collabora-
tion in Maine, as shown by recent discussion
around the development of a pharmaceutical
warehouse and distribution center on the
Penobscot Indian reservation. This proposed
opportunity would create much-needed
employment and revenue opportunities for 
the tribe and make cheaper drugs available 
for all residents of Maine.  
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ENDNOTES
1. “American Indian,” “Native American,” “nation,” and
“tribe” are all used interchangeably throughout the
article. My personal experience has shown me that it
is acceptable to use them in such a manner. “Nation,”
although admittedly not a native concept, is used here
to imply the sovereign state of Native American
nations and how intergovernmental relations should
be conducted in a nation-to-nation, government-to-
government manner.
2. In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 83-280, which
gave five states criminal and partial civil jurisdiction
over tribal members. In 1958, the state of Alaska was
added. At the same time, states were given the option
to assume jurisdictional powers over tribes. Only 10
took advantage of the opportunity. Since 1968, several
states and tribes have signed land settlement claims
which, in some cases, have conferred jurisdictional
powers over tribes to states. For a further explana-
tion of Public Law 83-280, and for a list of states that
have taken jurisdiction over tribes, see Brimley (2004).
3. See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1.
4. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
5. See, for example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (25 USCA §§2701-2721), and the Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1994 (PL 103-413).
6. The use of “settlement act” throughout the article
also implies the implementation act, which was passed
by the U.S. Congress to ratify the settlement act.
7. Although there are two Passamaquoddy Indian reser-
vations in Maine, which are distinct from one another
in many ways, both will be collectively referred to as
the Passamaquoddy Tribe throughout the article.
8. It is ironic to note that the original act in 1790 has
been attributed to then Secretary of War Henry
Knox, a Mainer with a substantial amount of landhold-
ings in both the Penobscot Indian Nation and
Passamaquoddy Tribe’s traditional territories. See
Rolde (2004) for more details on Henry Knox.
9. The same argument about the applicability of the
intercourse act of 1790 has successfully been used 
by several other tribes in their land claim cases such
as in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
New York and Florida.
Stephen Brimley is a consultant
to Native American nations and
non-native organizations on envi-
ronmental, economic development
and criminal justice-related issues.
Current projects include work
with the Northern Cheyenne
tribe in Montana to evaluate 
the U.S. Department of Justice-
funded Comprehensive Indian
Resources for Community and
Law Enforcement (CIRCLE)
project. He also has extensive
experience working with commu-
nities throughout southern and
eastern Africa on community-
based initiatives. He has a master’s
degree in anthropology and
ecology of development from 
the University of London.
Please turn the page for more references.
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10. It would be nearly impossible to recreate the entire
historical background of the settlement in this paper.
This section, therefore, borrows from two much more
detailed and thorough explanations of the case
(Brodeur 1985; Rolde 2004).
11. The majority of this discussion was indirectly 
taken from a paper explaining the Maine Indian 
Claims Settlement Act by Diana Scully, former
Executive Director of the Maine Indian Tribal-State
Commission (1995).
12. See 25 USCA §§2701-2721.
13. See 30 M.S.R.A. Section 7201 et seq.
14. Such a review can be found on the Aroostook 
Band of Micmacs Web site: (www.micmac-
nsn.gov/html/legal_issues.html).
15. See, in particular, sections 2(b) (4), 6(b), and section 11
in the 1991 law.
16. The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development is housed at the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard University.
Their research findings can be found at:
(www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied).
17 See the Harvard Project Web site for both casino 
and non-gaming examples. Specific examples 
include the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians in
Philadelphia, Mississippi and the White Mountain
Apache tribe and surrounding northern Arizona
towns and communities.
18. For more information on tribal-state relations,
see Native Americans in the New Millennium
on the Harvard Project on American Indian 
Economic Development Web site:
(www.harvard.ksg.edu/hpaied).
19. The Indian Affairs Department accomplishes its
mission by: (1) recognizing and respecting the sover-
eign status of tribal governments; (2) enhancing and
improving communication and outreach; (3) assisting
in developing policies that may result in positive reso-
lution to issues affecting Native American Indian
people; (4) utilizing intergovernmental and intra-
agency coordination and collaboration; and (5) institu-
tionalizing an implementation process that provides a
framework for how the state and tribal governments
will exercise agreed upon policy and principles. More
information on the New Mexico Indian Affairs Office
can be found on the Web at: (www.state.nm.us/oia).
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